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Dairy Market Participation with Endogenous Livestock Ownership:  
Evidence from Cote d’Ivoire 
 
Increasing participation in agricultural markets is a key factor to lifting rural households out of 
poverty in Africa countries (e.g., Delgado 1995). Markets represent a channel for sectoral and 
macro economic policies that aim to improve welfare of peasants households. Stimulating 
participation of subsistence farmers into market will help them to benefit from these economic 
opportunities and is relevant to achieve food security and poverty alleviation. Yet the economic 
literature on market participation, while growing in scope and depth, continues to be relatively 
thin (Bellemare and Barret 2006). 
The typical approach in the extant literature is to divide the market-participation 
decision into two stages. In the first stage, households that produce a particular commodity 
decide whether to be net buyers, net sellers, or autarkic in the market for that commodity. In 
the second stage, net buyers and net sellers determine the extent of market participation. This 
two-stage conceptual model of market participation lends itself to econometric models that 
address sample selection, such as Heckman’s two-stage approach (Heckman 1979). For 
applications to agricultural market participation in developing-country settings, see for 
example Goetz (1992); Holloway et al. (2000); Holloway, Barrett, and Ehui (2005); and 
Bellemare and Barret (2006). While this literature has evolved to refine the econometric 
models, the basic conceptual approach remains. 
  However, the extant literature ignores an important stage of the household marketing 
decision, as well as a second source of potential sample selection; namely, the decision to 
produce a commodity in the first place. The papers listed above observe only those households 
that produce the (potentially) marketed commodity. For example, studies that address   2
participation in dairy markets sample only households that own livestock (e.g., Holloway, 
Barret, Ehui 2005; Bellemare and Barret 2006). However, livestock ownership is the result of 
an economic decision made by households; that is, livestock owners are self-selected. As a 
result, existing estimates of the determinants of market participation may be biased. Moreover, 
even if this potential source of sample selection is not an issue—which is an empirical 
question—inference from the existing research is necessarily limited to producing households, 
and thus are not of use for informing the design and evaluation of, for example, development 
projects aimed at increasing market participation by encouraging livestock ownership. 
  This paper seeks to address this void in the market participation literature. To our 
knowledge, it is the first market participation study that specifically treats endogenous 
ownership of productive capital (livestock). In addition to correcting for a potentially important 
source of bias, our approach also allows us to extend inference to a broader population of rural 
households. For example, we are able to evaluate the implications of higher market prices or 
lower transactions costs for not only the volume of marketed surplus from existing cattle 
owners, but also for the propensity of rural households more broadly to adopt livestock. Our 
analysis of rural dairy markets in Cote d’Ivoire also represents a rare look at market 
participation in West Africa. 
  The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we give an overview 
of the relevant literature on market participation by rural households in developing countries. 
We then lay out a theoretical model of household participation in dairy markets that explicitly 
captures the discrete livestock ownership decision, and briefly present the Heckman sample 
selection model that treats sales as a censored dependent variable. After briefly describing the   3
data, we present and discuss econometric results. The last section closes this paper with 
concluding remarks and policy implications. 
Previous Work on Agricultural Market Participation among Agrarian Households 
Participation in agricultural markets by rural households is an important strategy for 
poverty alleviation and food security in developing countries (Heltberg and Tarp 2001). 
Peasant farmers communities are among the poorest and the largest in developing countries, so 
policies that stimulate their interaction in the exchange economy will enhance economic 
growth.  
However, agricultural households often face imperfect or incomplete markets for some 
goods and factors, which are then non-tradable and production and consumption decisions are 
no longer separable (Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995). Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) summarize 
the sources of incomplete or imperfect markets facing agrarian households, including costs 
resulting from distance from markets, poor infrastructure, high marketing margins, imperfect 
information, supervision and incentive costs. Hence the literature’s interest in the effects of 
transactions costs on market participation (e.g., Ehui, Benin, Paulos 2003; Goetz 1992; 
Holloway, Barrett, and Ehui 2005; Holloway and Ehui 2002; Holloway et al. 2004; Key, 
Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000; Staal, Delgado, and Nicholson 1997; Zaibet and Dunn 1998). As 
a result, the reduction of transactions costs, as a means of increasing market participation, has 
been identified as a goal of development policy (e.g., Delgado 1995). 
  In the case of dairy markets, perishability and bulkiness of raw milk add additional 
transactions costs (Holloway et al. 2000). The perishability of milk increases the likelihood of 
product spoilage and losses during milk processing or transport. The associated costs reduce 
the profitability of marketing milk. Holloway et al. (2000) used a tobit analysis of marketable   4
milk surplus to explore the impact of household-level transaction costs and the choice of 
production technique on the decision of peri-urban Ethiopian farmers to sell fluid milk to 
marketing cooperatives. The variables considered were capital stock (cross bred and 
indigenous bred), intellectual capital (experience, education and extension), provision of 
infrastructure (time to transport milk to market). Holloway et al. (2004) performed a Bayesian 
procedure to mitigate bias coming from assuming that the true point of censoring in the tobit 
regression is zero. They investigated the consequences of this incorrect assumption by using 
data on milk market participation in the Ethiopian highlands. Bellemare and Barrett (2006) 
estimated a two stage model of livestock market participation by herders in Eastern Africa. 
Their results indicated that prices matter to the amount of participation and fixed cost matter to 
both participation and amount of participation.  
  The empirical applications in the extant literature focus only on pastoralists or livestock 
owners, seeking to explain why some livestock owners participate in the market economy 
while others do not. However, as discussed in the introduction, livestock ownership is the 
result of an economic decision, and thus ignoring non-owners may result in sample selection 
bias. Conceptually, low milk prices or high transactions costs may discourage some households 
from owning livestock. In the next section we extend the standard conceptual framework for 
market participation to model livestock ownership explicitly.  
Theoretical Framework for Analyzing Dairy Market Participation 
We follow much of the recent market-participation literature in modeling dairy market 
participation as a two-step procedure, a market participation decision followed by a sales 
volume decision. Market participation, in this case, is defined as livestock ownership.   5
Application of Heckman’s (1979) two step procedure consists of using a probit in the first 
stage (livestock ownership) as follows: 
(1)  i i i i w h w Z ε α α + Φ = = )) , ( ( ) , 1 Pr(  
where Zi is an indicator variable equal to unity for households that own livestock,Φis the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function, the w is a vector of factors affecting market 
participation, the α is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, and εi is the error term assumed 
to be distributed normally with a mean of zero and a variance σ
2. The variable Zi takes the 
value of 1 if the marginal utility the household igets from participating in market is greater 
than zero, and zero otherwise. So we have: 
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In the second step, the inverse of mills ratio (IMR) is added as a regressor in the sales 
function regarding level of participation in order to correct for potential selection bias. If only 
the households who participate in the market are included in the second step, the IMR is 
computed as following 
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where φ(.) is the normal probability density function. The second-stage (sales) equation is then 
given by: 
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where E is the expectation operator, Y is the (continuous) extent of market participation, or 
sales, x is a vector of independent variables affecting sales, and β is the vector of the 
corresponding coefficients to be estimated. 
So Yi can be expressed as following: 
(7)  i i i i u x Y + + ′ = λ γ β ˆ *  
where ). , 0 ( ~ u i N u σ  
*
i Y is only observed for cattle owners (Zi = 1), in which case  .
*
i i Y Y =   
The livestock ownership regression (2) and the milk sales regression (7) are jointly 
estimated by full maximum likelihood using the Heckman procedure in STATA.   
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Data were collected from 185 agricultural households in the Savane province in northern Cote 
d’Ivoire where 85 percent of that country’s livestock exist—essentially all of these owned by 
small holders—and where there is potential for milk production and marketing. Cropping 
activities such as cotton, cashew nuts, mangoes, maize dominate the agricultural production in 
this province. Most livestock owners earn most of their income from crop agriculture, and, 
although draft power is used in most cotton plantations, cattle are not integrated into the 
agricultural production system (Barry 2001). Livestock are mainly kept as a form of wealth.  
The sampling method used for data collection was designed in two steps. First, the 
district of Khorogo was selected as the milk shed because of the relatively large share (42%) of 
milk production in the province (Atse 1990). In the second stage, 50 villages were selected 
along 6 main transportation routes linking producers in rural areas and consumers in the district 
capital. Criteria of selection were distance to district town market and milk production. In each 
village, an average of 3 or 4 households were selected randomly from the population of 
livestock owners and non livestock owners. The resulting sample includes 99 sedentary   7
agricultural households with livestock and 86 agricultural households without livestock were 
interviewed.  
The survey was administered in November 2006. Data were collected on household 
characteristics, household assets, transaction costs, access to information, extension, and credit 
services, and commodity prices. The unit of observation is the household, which in the case of 
livestock owners is extended to include the family of the livestock keeper. The household head 
is the decision maker regarding cow adoption. However, livestock owners typically lack 
livestock management skills, so daily cow management is typically performed by a hired 
Fulani or Peulh laborer with appropriate skills. Milk production is sold by the hired livestock 
keeper who gets the entire revenue as a complement to his cash salary. In some cases, the 
livestock owner may instruct the livestock keeper to leave the whole milk production to the 
calves to get healthier animals. Negotiated monthly cash salary for livestock keepers varies 
between 5,000 and 20,000 F.CFA, depending on herd size, and the extent to which the 
livestock owner requires the keeper to leave milk for the calves. 
Descriptive statistics for key variables are presented in table 2. Some differences 
between livestock owners and non-owners emerge from the summary statistics. Livestock 
owners are generally older and also wealthier than non-owners as indicated by ownership of 
assets. Livestock, while used for draught power and for milk, are also, and perhaps mainly, a 
form of wealth which may take time to accumulate. So, it is not surprising that livestock 
owners are, on average, older than non-owners.  
Livestock owners on average are located farther from the district market, perhaps 
because of greater availability of land for grazing. Livestock owners have on average twice the 
education as non-owners, although neither group has more than one year of schooling. Most of   8
the households surveyed who belong to the Peulh tribe are livestock producers. Indeed, the 
Peulh have a tradition of livestock management, and cattle rearing represent their primary 
activity.  
Marketed milk is sold mainly in fresh (raw) form. A small portion (approximately 10 
percent) of sales is in the form of sour milk or butter. This study focuses on fresh milk sales. 
The simple average selling price of fresh milk is 131 F.CFA per liter, while the average 
purchase price for non-owners is 123 F.CFA per liter.  
The average herd for livestock owners consists of 9 local dairy cows and 11 African 
cross-bred dairy cows. No exotic crossed breeds appear in the herds surveyed. The principal 
reason given by the households is the high cost of managing these cows. They require intensive 
care and are very sensitive to local diseases. Livestock owners receive an average of three 
extension visits annually. Livestock keepers earn an average monthly salary of 13,000 F.CFA 
per month.  
Empirical specification 
Equation (1) was used to predict the probability that a given household will adopt livestock. 
Then, determinants of milk sales, conditional on livestock ownership, are analyzed in the 
second step through equation (7). Using livestock ownership in the first stage of the marketing 
decision is a departure from the extant literature, which typically uses discrete net sales 
position (net buyer, autarkic, or net seller) as the first stage in the marketing decision. We do 
not estimate the net position because of 99 livestock owners, 88 are net milk sellers and 11 are 
autarkic. No livestock owners are net buyers of milk. So, the vast majority of households who 
own cows also sells milk. In this case, the market participation is highly for likely households   9
owning cows. In this sense, livestock ownership is the relevant discrete market participation 
decision.  
The livestock ownership regression, equation (1), was specified with a number of 
variables included to capture human capital, and wealth, market prices, and transactions costs 
associated with marketing milk. Variables used to specify equation (1) are described in table 
2a. We include the household head’s age and ownership of assets as proxies for wealth, and 
expect these to have a positive effect on livestock ownership. We include land area exploited 
as a measure of income from crop agriculture, which has an a priori ambiguous effect on 
livestock ownership. The larger is the land area exploited, the greater is the household’s 
income, and the more likely is the household to own cattle. However, greater land area 
exploited might also indicate a specialization in crop agriculture, in which case livestock 
ownership may be less likely. We also expect milk prices to be positively correlated with 
livestock ownership, as high milk prices increase returns to selling milk. The effect of distance 
to the district capital on livestock ownership is a priori ambiguous. Transport costs associated 
with selling milk increase with distance to market. However, as mentioned above, grazing land 
may be more available further from town. Finally, membership in the Peulh tribe is expected to 
increase the likelihood of livestock ownership because of this tribe’s tradition of livestock 
management. 
The milk sales regression, equation (7), was specified with a number of variables 
included to capture human capital, market prices, and transactions costs associated with 
marketing milk. Variables used to specify equation (7) are described in table 2b. Like much of 
the previous research, we include number of local cows and number of cross-bred cows, and 
expect sales to increase in number of all cows ceteris paribus, with a larger effect for cross-  10
bred cows(e.g., Bellemare and Barrett 2006; Holloway, Barrett, and Ehui 2005; Holloway et al. 
2000). We also include the number of extension visits under the hypothesis that such technical 
assistance enhances milk productivity and increases milk sales. Milk sales are expected to 
increase in milk price and decrease in the livestock keeper’s wage. We include family size, but 
do not have a basis for signing the effect a priori; larger families likely consume more milk, 
thus decreasing milk sales, but also have additional labor, which may increase milk sales. 
Distance to the district town of Khorogo is included as a measure of transport costs associated 
with selling milk. Also, we allow the intercept to differ across transportation routes.  
Econometric identification is made possible by the inclusion of wealth measures 
(number of televisions, number of refrigerators), human capital of the household head, and the 
indicator variable for membership in the Peuhl tribe, in the livestock ownership regression, and 
not in the milk sales regression. We think that proxies for wealth do not influence the volume 
of milk sold by the livestock keeper. Indeed, these wealth measures are specific to the 
household head and, because of the labor division described above, they are not expected to 
influence the livestock enterprise managed somewhat autonomously by hired labor. Similarly, 
education of the household head is not expected to influence the management of livestock 
since the livestock owner is typically not directly involved in cattle management. The ethnicity 
of the household head is also not expected to affect milk sales.  
Results 
Results of the livestock ownership regression are reported in table 3, with White’s robust 
standard errors reported in parentheses. In addition to the model estimates, we also report the 
marginal effect of each factor on the likelihood of cattle ownership. We find that adoption of   11
cattle in Cote d’Ivoire is influenced strongly by household characteristics, geography, and the 
fresh milk market price. All these effects have expected signs. 
The likelihood of owning livestock increases with the age of the household head, 
ceteris paribus. Ownership of a television and refrigerators also increase likelihood of 
livestock ownership. These results for age and household assets are consistent with the 
hypothesis that a certain level of wealth is required to acquire livestock. The effect of 
education is of the expected sign, but not statistically significant. 
The likelihood of livestock ownership is also increasing in the market price of fresh 
milk. This result supports our hypothesis that livestock ownership is indeed responsive to 
market signals. Thus, the previous literature on dairy market participation, which typically 
observes only livestock owners, may be missing an important source of sample selection bias.  
Distance to the district town of Korogho is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that the benefits of being far from town, such as greater availability of pasture land, 
outweigh the additional transactions costs of selling milk.  
As expected, membership in the Peulh tribe increases the likelihood of livestock 
ownerships. These results are in line with Barry (2001) who found in analyzing determinants of 
small ruminants’ adoption in the peri-urban region of Khorogo, that age and Peulh ethnic 
background enhance the probability of livestock adoption.  
Finally, the route dummies pick up significant regional differences in livestock 
ownership. Households along the Boundiali route are much more likely to own livestock, and 
households along the Mbengue and Sirasso routes are less likely to own livestock. These 
dummy variables may be picking up systematic differences in transactions costs (i.e., perhaps   12
the road from Boundiali to Khorogo is in better condition than others) and/or unobserved 
household characteristics.   
Results of the net milk sales regression are reported in table 4, with White’s robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Milk sales are increasing in all three variables associated with 
the household head (age, family size, and land area farmed), although only age and land area 
are statistically significant. These findings suggest that the division of labor discussed above is 
not complete; that is, livestock owners have some influence over milk marketing decisions. 
Milk sales are increasing in the market price, as expected, but the effect is statistically 
insignificant. Milk sales are decreasing in the livestock keeper’s salary, also as expected. This 
result is consistent with the observation that income from milk sales is a form of remuneration 
for the livestock keeper. Owners who pay higher salaries may also discourage milk sales, 
income from which is typically kept by the livestock keeper. More milk is available to calves, 
which encourages calf growth and thus increases the wealth of the livestock owner. 
As expected, milk sales are increasing in the number of both local cows and African 
cross-bred cows, ceteris paribus, and slightly more so for the latter, which is consistent with 
findings from previous research (e.g., Holloway et al. 2000, Ehui, Benin, and Paulos 2003, 
Lapar, Holloway, and Ehui 2003). Milk sales are also increasing in the number of extension 
visits, perhaps because technical assistance increases production and thus sales. 
We find a regional pattern in milk sales, with households along the Napie, Sucaf, and 
Mbengue routes marketing more milk than households in other regions, ceteris paribus. 
We also report in table 4 the estimated correlation across equation errors, ρ, and, for the 
sake of comparison, direct OLS estimation of equation (7);that is, estimates of a model of milk 
sales that ignores sample selection. We conduct a Wald test of the hypothesis that equations (2)   13
and (7) are independent (i.e., ρ = 0), and strongly reject the hypothesis. Thus, these data 
support the claim that livestock ownership is self-selected. Therefore, analysis that uses these 
data to study milk sales, but which ignores selection in cattle ownership, suffers from sample 
selection bias. 
Conclusion  
Application of the Heckman selectivity model was used to assess factors affecting milk 
sales among rural households in Cote d’Ivoire. We depart from the extant literature by 
controlling for selection into livestock ownership. We find that cattle ownership is self-
selected, so that an analysis of milk sales that ignores the cattle ownership decision would 
suffer from sample selection bias. To our knowledge, the entire literature on dairy market 
participation has ignored cattle ownership. Thus this study has potentially important 
implications for the agricultural market participation literature and for designing and evaluating 
development programs aimed at encouraging household marketing of agricultural products. In 
addition to correcting for a potentially important source of bias, our approach also allows us to 
extend inference to a broader population of rural households. For example, we are able to 
evaluate the implications of higher market prices or lower transactions costs for not only the 
volume of marketed surplus from existing cattle owners, but also for the propensity of rural 
households more broadly to adopt livestock. Finally, our analysis of rural dairy markets in Cote 
d’Ivoire also represents a rare look at livestock market participation in West Africa. 
On-going work is extending this research in several dimensions. We are attempting to 
model explicitly a clustered error structure that allows heteroscedasticity across the 50 villages, 
although preliminary work indicates little change from the results reported here. We are also 
evaluating an extension of the model used here to explicitly capture the discrete marketing   14
decision conditional on livestock ownership. Such a model would be a more direct extension of 
the standard, two-stage model (discrete decision of direction of market participation, followed 
by extent of market participation conditional on direction of market participation) to allow for 
self-selection in livestock ownership.    15
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Table 1: General characteristics of agricultural households and endowments 
 







Variables  Mean  St. dev.  Mean  St. dev.  difference 
          
Age of the household head (years)  55.3  14.8  48.7  13.5  0.0017*** 
Years of schooling for household head  0.7  1.8  0.4  0.7  0.03** 
Family size   10.7  3.6  7.4  3.0  0.0000*** 
Land size exploited (hectares)  15.8  18.4  10.2  7.1  0.009*** 
Distance to district Korhogo (km)  40.4  25.8  34.5  24.6  0.06* 
Market price of milk (F.CFA/liter)  132  28  124  21  0.01** 
Milk production (liter/month)  410  347       
Milk sales (liter/month)  323  318       
Milk consumption (liter/month)  69.4  59.3  8.2  13.6  0.0000*** 
Peulh tribe dummy  0.09  0.29  0.01  0.11  0.01** 
Napie route dummy  0.23  0.42  0.22  0.42  0.44 
Sucaf route dummy  0.12  0.33  0.13  0.34  0.42 
Boundiali route dummy  0.55  0.50  0.54  0.50  0.45 
Sirasso route dummy  0.16  0.37  0.13  0.34  0.1 
Mbengue route dummy  0.13  0.34  0.20  0.40  0.28 
Quantity of television owned  0.46  0.64  0.26  0.44  0.008*** 
Quantity of refrigerators owned  0.09  0.38  0.01  0.11  0.03** 
Number of extension visits  3.3  12.3       
Livestock keeper salary (F.CFA/month)  12,847  4,554       
Number of local cows  9.8  8.6       
Number of crossed cows  11.7  13.8       
Note: Asterisks denotes statistical significance of the difference at ten percent level of confidence (*), 
five percent level of confidence (**) and one percent level of confidence(***).    18
Table 2a: Description of the survey variables used in Livestock ownership regression. 
Variable name  Type
a  Description 
Dependent variable     
Cattle ownership  D  Dummy variable of whether or not a household owns cattle  
    
Independent variables     
Household head age  C  Age of the household head in years 
Education level of the 
household head 
C  Number of schooling years for formal education 
Television ownership  C  Number of television owned by the household 
Refrigerator ownership  C  Number of refrigerators owned by the household 
Land size exploited  C  Total size of land exploited by the household for farming 
in hectares 
Market price of milk  C  Average market price in F.CFA per liter. 
Distance from district 
Khorogo 
C  Distance from agricultural households to district town in 
kilometers 
Peulh tribe  D  Dummy variable indicating membership in the Peulh tribe 
Napie route  D  Dummy variable indicating geographic location of the 
household  
Sucaf route  D  Dummy variable indicating geographic location of the 
household 
Boundiali route  D  Dummy variable indicating geographic location of the 
household 
Sirasso route  D  Dummy variable indicating geographic location of the 
household 
Mbengue route  D  Dummy variable indicating geographic location of the 
household 
a/ “D” denotes discrete variable, “C” denotes a continuous variable.   19
Table 2b: Description of the survey variables used in Net Sales regression. 
Variable name  Type
a Description 
Dependent variable     
Net sales  C  Volume of milk sold in liters 
    
Independent variables     
Household head age  C  Age of the household head in years 
Family size  C  Number of people living in the household 
No. of local cows  C  Number of local cows in the herd 
No. of crossed bred cows  C  Number of crossed bred cows in the herd 
Number of extension visits  C  Number of extension visits received by the household 
within a year 
Land size exploited  C  Total size of land exploited by the household for 
farming in hectares 
Livestock keeper salary   C  Wage of the hired labor in F.CFA per month 
Market price of milk  C  Average market price in F.CFA per liter 
Distance from district town  C  Distance from agricultural households to district town 
in kilometers 
Napie route  D  Dummy variable indicating geographic location of the 
household 
Sucaf route  D  Dummy variable indicating geographic location of the 
household  
Boundiali route  D  Dummy variable indicating geographic location of the 
household 
Sirasso route  D  Dummy variable indicating geographic location of the 
household 
Mbengue route  D  Dummy variable indicating geographic location of the 
household 
a/ “D” denotes discrete variable, “C” denotes a continuous variable.   20
Table 3: Probit Estimates of the Determinants of Cattle Ownership 
Regressor Estimates  Marginal  effect 























































    
Number of observations  184   
N uncensored  86   
N censored  98   
Note: White’s robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the ten percent level of confidence (*), five percent level (**), and one percent level 
(***). The value of the log likelihood function at the optimum is -717.1. 
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ρ  0.899** 
(0.136) 
  
λ  160.528** 
(55.668) 
  
Note: White’s robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent (*) statistical significance at 10 percent level of confidence, five percent 
level (**), and one percent level (***).The value of the log likelihood function at the optimum is  
-717.1. 
 